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REUEL CHRISTENSEN (John Mc-
Allister substituted), Administrator of 
of the Estate of James A. Rasmussen, 
deceased, et al., 
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ELLSWORTH W. RASMUSSEN, also 
known as WANLASS RASMUSSEN 
OR W A N R A S M U S S E N and 
BLANCHE RASMUSSEN, his wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. J 
Case No. 
13663 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT AND NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs as Administrator and Guardian of the Es-
tates (hereinafter Administrator) of James A. and Sarah 
E. Rasmussen sued alleging certain transfers (of real 
property, grazing permits, waivers and sales) to defen-
dants were either forgeries or a result of undue influence, 
fraud, and coercion, and therefore void. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Plaintiffs-Respondents' Motion for New Trial was 
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granted and the trial court held that the Administrator of 
the two estates was, as opposed to defendants, entitled to 
possession of the real property and grazing permits, 
awarded the Administrator money damages and enjoined 
the defendants from asserting any claim or interest to 
said property except as defendant Ellsworth Wanlass 
Rasmussen is an heir and legatee of the estate. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The judgment and decree of the trial court should 
be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At the time of his death on December 13,1965, James 
A. Rasmussen left surviving him his wife Sarah Eta Ras-
mussen, and his seven children: Ruby R. Hill, Clinton 
D. Rasmussen, Ward B. Rasmussen, Alta R. Nielsen, the 
defendant Ellsworth Wanlass Rasmussen, Kenneth P. 
Rasmussen and Roger J. Rasmussen. His wife, Sarah 
Rasmussen died in April, 1967. 
James A. and Sarah E. Rasmussen were for many 
years residents of Ephraim, Sanpete County, State of 
Utah. He had owned real property in Ephraim and 
meadow land west of Ephraim. Mr. Rasmussen had also 
raised hay and cattle, and had ranged his cattle on fed-
eral forest land pursuant to forest permits. 
One of the children, defendant Ellsworth Wanless 
Rasmussen claims that in 1963 and again shortly before 
his death in 1965, that his father and mother (James A. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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and Sarah E. Rasmussen) transferred to him, certain 
tracts of land, grazing permits, and cattle which transfers 
the plaintiff-respondent Administrator refuses to recog-
nize as valid. 
In late 1962 and early 1963, the defendant Ellsworth 
Wanlass and his brother Roger, decided as a joint ven-
ture to buy the cattle which were to be sold as part of 
the so called Bagnell Estate. In seeking to assist the 
defendant Ellsworth Wanless, Mr. Rasmussen, at the re-
quest of his son, the defendant Ellsworth Wanlass, deeded 
10 acres to said defendant for the purpose of permitting 
him to use the land as security. Sometime after the pro-
posed purchase of the cattle had fallen through, Clinton 
and Roger testified that Mr. Rasmussen had told them 
that he had tried to get his son Ellsworth Wanlass to 
deed the land back, but he had refused (TV. Vol. I pages 
68-69). The Administrator alleged that this conveyance 
from James A. and Sarah Rasmussen was made as an 
accommodation to the defendant Ellsworth Wanlass and 
was meant to assist him in obtaining financing with the 
express agreement and understanding that the property 
would be reconveyed at his request. 
Ellsworth Wanlass Rasmussen disputes this and, 
while admitting that the conveyance arose out of an 
attempt to get a loan, claims that it was his father's in-
tention to give him the property outright (Tr. Vol. I 
pages 28-29). It is not disputed, however, that until his 
death Mr. Rasmussen continued in his possession of this 
land, caring for it, cropping it and paying the taxes 
thereon. 
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In November of 1965, Mr. Rasmussen became seri-
ously ill and was admitted to a Provo hospital and was 
discharged on November 11, 1965. His son, Clinton, testi-
fied that his father had told him on the way home from 
the hospital that his son Ellsworth Wanlass was putting 
pressure on him to get his land and that he was not about 
to let anyone have it (Tr. Vol. I page 73). 
On November 27, 1965, Mr. Rasmussen was read-
mitted to the hospital in Provo, Utah, and underwent 
an operation on December 1, 1965. He was discharged 
on December 8, 1965 and returned home. He went into 
a coma on December 11, and was taken to the hospital 
in Mount Pleasant, Utah and died there on December 13, 
1965. 
Defendants claim, and the Administrator disputes, 
that Mr. and Mrs. Rasmussen executed a warranty deed 
dated December 1, 1965, and thereby conveyed 25 acres 
of land to the defendant Ellsworth Wanless Rasmussen 
(Exhibit 5). The Administrator alleged that the signa-
ture of James A. Rasmussen on the deed was a forgery, 
contending that on the day the deed purported to be 
signed and notarized in Ephraim, Mr. Rasmussen had 
undergone an operation and was confined to a hospital 
in Provo, Utah. This deed was recorded December 9, 
1965, at the request of defendant Ellsworth Wanlass Ras-
mussen. 
The following day two additional deeds were re-
corded at the request of the defendant. One purported 
to be a warranty deed from Sarah E. Rasmussen to W. 
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Ellsworth Rasmussen conveying 7.13 acres (Exhibit 7). 
The property described in the deed included the land 
and home in which James A. and Sarah E. Rasmussen 
were then living. The other deed (Exhibit 6) described 
essentially the same tract. Although this deed was also 
recorded December 10, 1965, it was dated July 9, 1954, 
and purported to transfer the tract from James A. Ras-
mussen to his wife. The Administrator contended that 
James A. Rasmussen had never delivered this deed to 
his wife Sarah and that it was ineffective, and that, there-
fore, the deed from Sarah Rasmussen to Ellsworth Wan-
lass Rasmussen was also ineffective to transfer any in-
terest inasmuch as Mrs. Rasmussen did not own the 
property. The Administrator introduced at trial seven 
additional deeds from James A. Rasmussen to his wife 
Sarah all dated July 9, 1954. It was not disputed that 
these deeds were never delivered to Sarah Rasmussen, 
but rather remained at all times in the possession of Mr. 
Rasmussen as did the property described therein. 
Moreover, it was not disputed that at the time of 
the purported tranfer from Sarah E. Rasmussen to the 
defendant W. Ellsworth that Mrs. Rasmussen was 87 
years old, that she was severely hard of hearing and had 
much difficulty in seeing. The Administrator contended 
that the December 10 (Exhibit 7) deed was executed 
by her without knowledge of its nature and effect, and 
that upon being informed of that she had apparently exe-
cuted a deed conveying the home in which she and her 
husband were living, she repudiated the transfer and at-
tempted to have the property reconveyed. 
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Additioinal issues at trial involved the transfer of 
grazing permits and a bill of sale for cattle. 
Exhibit 19 purports to be a transfer by James Ras-
mussen to Ellsworth W. Rasmussen of Forest Service 
grazing permits as to 22 head of cattle. Exhibit 17 is a 
bill of sale from James A. Rasmussen to defendant Ells-
worth W. Rasmussen for 22 head of cattle. The face of 
both documents indicate that they are signed by the 
senior Mr. Rasmussen on December 9, 1965. The Ad-
ministrator alleged that the signature on the grazing 
permit and bill of sale were forgeries. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD 
THAT THE 1954 DEED (EXHIBIT 6) WAS 
NOT DELIVERED FROM JAMES A. RAS-
MUSSEN TO HIS WIFE AND THEREFORE 
INEFFECTIVE TO CONVEY REAL PROP-
ERTY. 
Defendant Ellsworth Wanlass Rasmussen claims that 
before his father's death his parents gave him a deed 
dated July 9, 1954, purporting to transfer the family 
home and several surrounding acres of land from James 
A. Rasmussen to Sarah E. Rasmussen (Exhibit 6). 
Defendants contend in Point I of their Brief on 
Appeal that the trial court erred in determining that the 
deed of July 9, 1954, (Exhibit 6) was not delivered by 
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Mr. Rasmussen to his wife and, therefore, ineffective. 
It is undisputed, however, that Exhibit 27 consists of 7 
additional deeds all dated July 9, 1954, all of which pur-
port to transfer property from James A. Rasmussen to 
his wife Sarah Rasmussen. Defendants do not dispute 
the fact that after 1954 Mr. Rasmussen retained all the 
deeds among his own personal papers and that he con-
tinued in possession of all the property described, that 
he farmed the property, that he worked the land, and 
that he paid the taxes on the property. 
Defendants' contention that there was effective de-
livery of Exhibit 6 is not based upon any delivery to 
Sarah Rasmussen, but instead is based upon the posses-
sion of the defendant Wanlass Ellsworth who recorded 
it. Defendants argue that the only evidence of how the 
deed came into the possession of the defendant Wanlass 
Ellsworth and how it subsequently became recorded was 
defendant's own testimony. This testimony, however, 
produced no evidence that would tend to show that James 
Rasmussen ever delivered the deed to his wife. In fact, 
the defendant himself testified that he had no knowledge 
of the deed after 1954 and that he did not remember 
which of his parents had given him the deed (Tr. Vol. 
I pages 166, 196). 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED 
THAT SARAH E. RASMUSSEN DID NOT 
UNDERSTAND THE NATURE OF THE 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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WARRANTY DEED -(EXHIBIT 7) FROM 
HERSELF TO DEFENDANT WANLESS 
ELLSWORTH RASMUSSEN WHEN SHE 
SIGNED IT. 
On December 10, 1965, Wanlass Rasmussen recorded 
a deed (Exhibit 7) purporting to transfer property from 
his mother to himself. (This deed covered the same prop-
erty as referred to in Exhibit 6 discussed in Point I above 
with the exception of 1.01 acres which had been deeded 
by Mr. and Mrs. Rasmussen to the defendant Wanless 
Ellsworth in 1963; this conveyance of 1,01 acres to the 
defendant is not in dispute.) 
With respect to Exhibit 7, the court made the fol-
lowing trial findings: 
At the time of said purported transfer by 
Warranty Deed of said property from Sarah E. 
Rasmussen to defendant, the said Sarah E. Ras-
mussen did not own said property; that said 
property was then, and at all times had been, 
owned by her husband, James A. Rasmussen, 
deceased (R. 143). 
Further, the court finds that at the time the 
said Sarah Rasmussen signed the deeds referred 
to in Findings 15 and 16 above, she was ad-
vanced in years, being of the age of 87 years, 
and was physically in poor health; that she 
was hard of hearing and suffered from poor 
vision so that she was unable either to hear 
or see very well; was enfeebled in body and had 
difficulty in caring for herself. The deed was 
executed by her without knowledge as to its na-
ture and effect, and she was not aware that she 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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was purportedly transferring and conveying to 
the defendant the property described in said 
deeds particularly the home in which she and her 
husband were then living. Neither transaction 
was explained to her, and she was not advised of 
the nature and effect of what she was doing. Nor 
was she given an opportunity to receive advice 
or counsel from anyone in respect thereto. Later, 
upon being informed that she had apparently 
executed a deed on the home to her son Ells-
worth, she repudiated such purported transfer 
and attempted to have the property reconveyed 
by said defendant (R. at 154). 
The following evidence supports these findings: 
On December 14, 1965, the day after Mr. Rasmus-
sen's funeral, there was a conversation in the Rasmussen 
home among Mrs. Rasmussen and the three sons, Clinton, 
Wanlass, and Kenneth. Clinton Rasmussen testified that 
he had asked his mother whether she had given Wanlass 
the property and she had answered, "No" (Tr. Vol. II 
pages 307-308). 
Subsequently, in April of 1966, the family members 
met at Kenneth Rasmussen's home in Salt Lake City. 
Ward Rasmussen took charge of the meeting and stated 
that one purpose of the gathering was to ask Mrs. Ras-
mussen whether or not she had deeded or otherwise given 
the said property to her son Wanlass — if she were to 
say she had, the family was instructed to forget their 
claim to the property, but if she denied this, Wanlass 
was to release his claim to the property. At this time, 
Clinton Rasmussen testified that Wanlass asked his 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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mother, "You know you want me to have this property. 
If I don't get it, I won't have any," and that Mrs. Ras-
mussen had answered, "No, Wan [Wanlass], I didn't give 
you the property." Clinton Rasmussen further testified 
that Wanlass told his mother that his dad had given him 
the property some two or three years ago. Mrs. Rasmus-
sen responded, "If he did, he never told me about it" 
(Tr. Vol. I pages 83-85 and 144). 
The eldest child of Mr. and Mrs. Rasmussen, Ruby 
Hill, testified that on the day following her father's fun-
eral she had remained home with her mother while the 
rest of the family members had attended another funreal. 
At this time she had asked her mother whether she knew 
that she had signed a deed conveying her home, and the 
property it was on, to her son Wanlass and Mrs. Ras-
mussen had replied that she had signed no deeds and 
had not given any deeds to her son Wanlass. She did 
state that a man had come to her home; he had sat at 
the table, but she could not see or hear him very well and 
did not recognize him. Mrs. Rasmussen said that in the 
presence of this man (apparently the notary) she had 
signed some grazing permits which her son Wanlass told 
her would be lost if she did not sign them (Tr. of first 
trial Vol I pages 248-250, Vol. II 251). (This testimony 
was admitted into evidence by stipulation at the second 
trial.) 
The fact that Mrs. Rasmussen had failing eyesight 
and very poor hearing is not disputed. Moreover, defen-
dants admit that Mrs. Rasmussen was in failing health 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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and in a position to be dominated by her children (Re-
spondents' Brief at 5). No one was in a better position 
to dominate his mother during the period in question 
than the defendant Wanlass Rasmussen. He lived next 
door to his mother and she would have naturally trusted 
and relied upon him during this period of her husband's 
illness. Among other things she relied upon him in that 
he prepared checks for her signature during her husband's 
illness (Tr .Vol. II p. 282). 
The evidence adduced at trial was that Mrs. Ras-
mussen was unaware of the nature and effect of the deed 
and that she was not aware that the deed purported to 
transfer and convey to the defendants the home in which 
she and her husband were then living. There was no 
evidence that the transaction was explained to her and 
she was not advised of the nature and effect of what she 
was doing. She was not given an opportunity to receive 
counsel or advice from anyone except the defendant 
Wanlass Rasmussen, and subsequently on being informed 
that she had apparently executed a deed transferring 
her home to Wanlass, she repudiated the transfer and 
attempted to have the property reconveyed to her by 
said defendant both orally and by a written statement 
signed by her (Exhibit 20). After evaluating the credi-
bility to be given each witness, the evidence establishing 
these findings was ample for the trial court to make its 
determination. 
POINT III. 
TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
THE 1963 DEED (EXHIBIT 3) WAS GIVEN 
TO DEFENDANT WANLASS RASMUSSEN 
CONDITIONALLY AND THAT THE PROP-
ERTY WOULD BE RECONVEYED UPON 
REQUEST. 
The admitted purpose of the transfer evidenced by 
Exhibit 3 was to permit James Rasmussen's son, the de-
fendant Wanlass Rasmussen, to use the property as se-
curity for a Farmers Home Administration loan (Ap-
pellants' Brief at 6). The administrator argues that 
this transfer was conditional and was for the purpose 
of obtaining financing only. This fact was substantiated 
by the teBtimony of Clinton Rasmussen who testified 
that his father told him that he had asked his son Wan-
lass to return the land, but that he had refused to do so. 
Kenneth Rasmussen also testified that his father had told 
him that Wanlass refused to reconvey the property. The 
nature of the transaction is further clarified by the un-
disputed fact that Mr. Rasmussen continued to farm 
the property, continued to exercise control over it, crop 
the property, work on the property, and pay the taxes 
on the property. 
Defendants attempt to make much of the fact that 
James A. Rasmussen had earlier required his son Wan-
less in return 10 acres before his son moved to Las Vegas, 
which had been deeded to Wanlass in 1932 when 10 acres 
had also been deeded both to Clinton and Kenneth. The 
defendant admitted, however, that these deeds were not 
meant as transfers (Tr. Vol. I page 274). And it is clear 
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that Mr. Rasmussen intended to take care of the formal-
ity of having these sons deed these properties back to 
him. In fact in 1954 deeds were prepared which would 
have deeded this property back to Mr. Rasmussen (Ex-
hibit 27). It is significant that neither Kenneth Ras-
mussen nor Clinton Rasmussen have claimed any interest 
in the property pursuant to these deeds and that they 
both have always recognized that the deeds were to be 
used solely for the purpose of obtaining grazing permits. 
Even the testimony of Wanlass Rasmussen substanti-
ates the fact that the purported transfer of the ten acres 
to Wanlass in 1963 was conditional: 
Q. So far as you are concerned, if your 
father had asked for that 10 acres back which 
was deeded to you in 1963 if he [had] asked for 
it back before he died, you would have given it 
to him, wouldn't you? 
A. Yes (Tr. Vol. I page 245). 
Moreover, James Rasmussen had executed other 
deeds which were undisputedly not intended to convey 
property (Tr. Vol. I pages 158-159 and 274). This fact 
lends further support to the finding that this particular 
transfer was conditional. Even the testimony of the de-
fendant offers Httle support for the argument that the 
deed was given unconditionally. 
The trial court heard the witnesses and evaluated 
the credibility of each. The court's finding should be 
affirmed. 
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POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD 
THAT THE SIGNATURE OF JAMES A. 
RASMUSSEN ON EXHIBIT 5 WAS A FOR-
GERY. 
Exhibit 5 purports to be a warranty deed transfer-
ring 25 acres from James A. Rasmussen and his wife to 
the defendant Ellsworth Wanlass Rasmussen. The ad-
ministrator contended that the signature of James A. 
Rasmussen had not been authored by him and the trial 
court so held. 
Robert F. Grube was called as an expert witness to 
examine the signature of James A. Rasmussen on Ex-
hibit 5 and to testify as to the author of the signature. 
Mr. Grube had been employed by the United States 
Secret Service for 33 years and defendants stipulated as 
to his qualification as a handwriting expert. Comparing 
signatures known to have been authored by James A, 
Rasmussen with the signature on Exhibit 5, Mr. Grube 
testified that the same person did not author the James 
Rasmussen signature on Exhibit 5 (Tr. Vol. II page 375). 
Mr. Grube also supplied the basis for his opinion, testi-
fying in great detail on this point (Tr. Vol. II pages 375-
381). 
To rebut Mr. Grube's testimony, defendants called 
Edgar Anderson and McKay Anderson, cashiers at the 
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Bank of Ephraim, to testify that they had witnessed Mr. 
Rasmussen sign Exhibit 5. 
Edgar Anderson admitted that Exhibit 5 could not 
have been notarized by him on the date that the docu-
ment shows because he had learned at the prior trial that 
Mr. Rasmussen had undergone on operation and was 
confined to a hospital on that date (Tr. Vol. II page 428). 
Mr. Anderson admitted that sometimes deeds are 
prepared and dated and sometimes not signed until later 
(Tr. Vol. II page 427). But he said he would never back 
date a deed (Tr. Val. II page 428). Mr. Anderson further 
admitted that he had no recollection of the particular 
transaction so that he could say that Mr. or Mrs. Ras-
mussen were present when he put his acknowledgment 
on the deed (Tr. Vol. II page 437). 
McKay Anderson, who also allegedly witnessed the 
signature of Mr. and Mrs. Rasmussen at the Rasmussen 
home admitted that the only way he could remember 
that he had witnessed Mr. and Mrs. Rasmussen sign 
Exhibit 5 was because he had been to the Rasmussen 
home fo rthat purpose on only one occasion (Tr. Vol. II 
page 443). Nevertheless, the witness was unable to ex-
plain whether it was Exhibit 5 which had in fact been 
witnessed by him at the Rasmussen home or Exhibit 4 
which purports to have been witnessed by him one year 
earlier. 
The weight to be given the testimony of Edgar and 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
McKay Anderson to the effect that they had gone to 
the Rasmussen home to witness the signatures on the 
particular documents in question is further demonstrated 
by the fact that Mr. Rasmussen did not return home 
from the hospital until December 8, 1965. He went 
into a coma on December 11th and the deed was 
recorded December 9 by the defendant Wanlass Ras-
mussen at 2:00 p.m. This necessarily means that if 
Mr. Rasmussen signed the deed, it was between the time 
he arrived home in Ephraim on the 8th and before 2:00 
p.m. on the 9th — seven or eight days after the deed 
actually purports to have been signed and notarized. * 
Mr. Anderson admitted, however, that he might have 
told attorney Udell Jensen in September of 1968 that the 
deed was signed and notarized at the bank (necessarily 
on the 8th or 9th) contrary to his testimony on direct 
examination that the deed was signed at the Rasmussen 
home (Tr. Vol. II page 431). 
The clear testimony of Mr. Grube as to the hand-
writing of the signature and the unsure and confused 
testimony of Messrs. Anderson, gave the trial court suf-
ficient grounds to find that the signature was a forgery. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD 
THAT THE AUTHOR OF THE SIGNATURE 
OF JAMES A. RASMUSSEN ON EXHIBITS 
16, 17, 18 AND 19 WAS NOT JAMES A. RAS-
MUSSEN. 
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Exhibits 16, 17, 18 and 19 purport to be two bills 
of sale and two grazing permits transferring cattle and 
grazing permits from James A. Rasmussen to the defen-
dant Wanlass Rasmussen and his brother Roger Ras-
mussen. Roger Rasmussen has refused to accept the 
purported transfer to himself. Wanlass Rasmussen claims 
the transfer is valid. The trial court ruled as follows: 
On the 9th or 10th day of December, 1965, 
two documents entitled Bill of Sale and two doc-
uments entitled Waiver of Grazing Preference 
were purportedly executed by the decedent 
James A. Rasmussen involving cattle and range 
permits which he at that time owned. One of 
said Bills of Sale and Transfer of Grazing Per-
mits was to defendant Ellsworth W. Rasmussen 
and the other to Roger J. Rasmussen. Notwith-
standing said documents appear to bear the sig-
nature of James A. Rasmussen, the Court finds 
that said documents were not in fact executed 
by the said James A. Rasmussen; that his sig-
nature thereon is a forgery; and that therefore 
said Bills of Sale and Waivers are null and void, 
and title to said cattle and grazing permits never 
The Court further finds in respect thereto 
that the said Roger J. Rasmussen has never 
claimed the title to said cattle or grazing per-
mits purported to be transferred to him. 
As a consequence of said purported Bill of 
Sale, defendant Ellsworth W. Rasmussen took 
possession of 12 head of cattle and one bull on 
or about the 13th day of December, 1965, which 
belonged to the said James A. Rasmussen, de-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
ceased, and wrongfully converted the same to 
his own use (R. 143-144). 
To support this contention that the signatures on 
the grazing permits were valid, defendants called L. R. 
Burr, a retired automobile dealer in Ephraim, to testify 
that he had notarized the James Rasmussen signature 
on these documents. Although Mr. Burr testified that 
he witnessed the signature he also testified to the con-
trary. 
Q. I ask you if you have any recollection 
that his signature was on there, or are you just 
relying on your custom and practice? 
A. I am relying on my custom and practice 
(Tr. Vol. II page 470). 
Q. Do you know whether there were any 
signatures on the documents before you signed? 
A. I don't know if there were or not (Tr. 
Vol. II page 465). 
Moreover, the documents were purportedly signed on 
December 10, 1965, but Judy Westenskow Lott, a house-
keeper who lived in the Rasmussen home during the 
last illness of James A. Rasmussen, testified that when 
Mr. Rasmussen returned from the hospital in December 
of 1965, that he was too ill to sign checks (Tr. Vol. II 
page 508). 
Against the equivocal testimony of Mr. Burr and 
Mrs. Lott, the trial court heard the testimony of Mr. 
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Grube (whose qualifications to testify as an expert was 
stipulated to by defendants) that the signatures on these 
documents were not authored by the same person who 
had authored other signatures which were accepted as 
the genuine signature of James Rasmussen (Tr. Vol. II 
page 375). 
The trial court weighed the credibility of each wit-
ness and, contrary to the contention of defendants, the 
court was not compelled to find the testimony of de-
fendants' witnesses as 100 per cent credible on every 
point while disregarding plaintiff's testimony. The trial 
court's finding was correct. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's finding that there existed a con-
fidential relationship between Sarah Rasmussen and her 
son, the defendant, Wanlass Ellsworth Rasmussen was 
apparently based inter alia upon the following facts: Mrs. 
Rasmussen's husband became seriously ill in November 
and December of 1965; she was severely hard of hearing 
and had failing eyesight; her health was so poor that she 
was unable to visit her husband in the hospital (Tr. Vol. 
II page 507); her handwritting was so shaky she usually 
had to have someone guide her hand; the defendant made 
out checks for his mother to sign on behalf of his father 
while he was in the hospital (Tr. Vol. II page 282) and 
during the illness and hospitalization of her husband, Mrs. 
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Rasmussen needed help and accepted care from the de-
fendant because he lived next door and she had apparent 
trust and confidence in him. 
Moreover, as soon as Mrs. Rasmussen learned of the 
purported transfer she repudiated it at a family gathering 
with the defendant present and also in a written state-
meat (Exhibit 20). 
It is plaintiffs' position that the relationship between 
Sarah E. Rasmussen and her son Wanlass Ellsworth was 
"such as would lead an ordinary prudent person in the 
management of his business affairs to repose that degree 
of confidence in the other person which largely results 
in the substitution of the will of the latter for that of 
the former." Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 16 U. 2d 378, 383, 
401 P. 2d 710 (1965). 
Based upon this confidential relationship it was de-
fendant's burden to convince the trial court by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the gifts and conveyances 
were fair. Johnson v. Johnson, 9 U. 2d 40, 337 P. 2d 420 
(1959). Instead, it is clear that plaintiffs have proved the 
reverse — that the transactions were not fair. 
With respect to the James Rasmussen signature as 
well as the other evidence, the trial court was in the ad-
vantageous position of being present to evaluate the testi-
mony and its credibility. Not only does the record reveal 
that there is substantial evidence to support the trial 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21 
court's ruling, but a review of the record reveals to the 
reader that the evidence clearly preponderates for the 
findings made by the court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Arthur H. Nielsen 
Earl Jay Peck 
NIELSEN, CONDER, 
HANSEN & HENRIOD 
410 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Udell R. Jensen 
Nephi, Utah 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiffs and Respondents 
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